Three causes of the failed Ukrainian summer counteroffensive in 2023
Is Ukrainian society ready to endure casualties?
Intro
Ukrainian society has placed a lot on its counter-offensive in 2023. Against the background of past successes, Ukraine and the West were publicly emitting confidence in this counter-offensive. I want to offer three out of many causes of this failure (here I am regarding this offensive as a failure - but it could be argued otherwise). I will provide a brief analysis of past successes and finish by outlining what will win this protracted conflict.
P.S. The subtitle is intriguing, I know; the answer is in the text.
Russian blunder
Ukraine has already achieved remarkable success by thwarting Russia's primary strategic objective: subjugating Ukraine and capturing Kyiv within the first hours of the invasion. For a nation and people who largely did not anticipate a large-scale war, Ukraine has shown incredible resilience. Notably, Ukraine had not been preparing for this type of conflict since 2014. In contrast, Russia's performance has revealed that it is not the formidable "second military power" behind the U.S. as once believed. Over the past two years, the concept of war has evolved, shifting from preparing special forces for expeditionary missions to considering the renewal of conscription in the West.
Past Successes
After the initial shock of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine's primary goal was survival, which it achieved successfully. Following this, Ukraine conducted three proficient counter-offensives, demonstrating its ability not only to survive but also to reclaim lost territory. Initially, the West was reluctant to supply Ukraine with new weapons to avoid so-called escalation. However, once these weapons were provided, Ukraine achieved battlefield successes. An interesting trend emerged: Ukraine received new weaponry only after successful offensives. The dual offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson are prime examples where Ukraine disrupted Russian defense lines by targeting supply chains, nodes, and hubs, followed by coordinated offensive actions. Attrition played a crucial role, extending Russian supply lines and depleting their ammunition through precise targeting by HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems). Geography also played a vital role, particularly in the Kherson region, where, despite robust defense lines, the right bank of the Dnipro River fell due to untenable Russian positions, forcing their troops to withdraw.
Ukrainian blunder
The summer counter-offensive was distinct from the campaigns in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson. It was conceived as a dual offensive in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, intended to divert attention and exploit any success. In the 2023 summer counter-offensive, the main axes were Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia. While the latter was anticipated by the Russians, the former was unexpected. This counter-offensive ultimately failed for several reasons: the scarcity of new Western weapons, lack of training in combined arms warfare, and societal unwillingness to suffer casualties.
The scarcity of new Western weapons
Most Ukrainian media attributed the failure solely to the lack of Western equipment and weaponry. While this had a significant impact, the failure cannot be attributed entirely to the absence of weapons. Historical examples demonstrate that new technology alone does not alter battlefield outcomes; rather, the effective employment of these systems and tactics is crucial. The mere appearance of Abrams and Leopards on the battlefield did not change the dynamic on the Zaporizhzhia front, even though there was an expectation in the West, Ukraine, and Russia that their presence alone could break through the frontline. Russian propaganda exploited the first struck Leopard as a victory, thanks to "our brave liberators," attempting to dispel the "magical effect" these tanks were believed to have on the front. Thus, the tactics of employment were flawed, and this is not purely a Ukrainian issue, as most, if not all, brigades operating these tanks were trained by Western instructors. Furthermore, Western forces have not encountered such heavily mined fields since 1945, highlighting the need to revise Western military doctrines. This issue of tactics and employment of tanks is not unique to tanks; it concerns all kinds of weapons, making the most daunting task the effective combination of these systems.
Lack of training in combined arms warfare
The second point is the lack of experienced personnel to conduct combined arms warfare. Warfare has become increasingly sophisticated and complex, requiring skilled and experienced personnel to manage all domains and weaponry. Ukraine was unprepared for large-scale warfare. Despite having well-trained Special Operations forces that made a significant impact early in the war by infiltrating the enemy's rear and undertaking subversive activities, the infantry soldiers were not ready. The situation was further exacerbated by the attrition of both Russian and Ukrainian forces over two years, depleting Ukraine's experienced soldiers from the 2014 conflict. Furthermore, the Ukrainians might have lost more than 70% of their combat-experienced personnel since 2022. Eventually, this led to a lack of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) at the brigade level and above, which is crucial for conducting combined arms operations on a large scale. This was problematic during the summer counter-offensive, as Ukraine did not manage to scale up and had to undertake offensives at the company and platoon levels. The summer 2023 counter-offensive once again required enormous skill and experience, including the de-confliction of aircraft with air defenses and the management of all combat domains. The absence of these aspects led to a meager outcome in the counter-offensive.
Societal unwillingness to suffer casualties
The third obstacle is more subjective and controversial: Was Ukrainian society ready to suffer significant losses to liberate the Zaporizhzhia region? Before the summer of 2023, buoyed by the successful liberation of Kherson and Kharkiv, the answer seemed to be yes. However, did Ukrainian society fully grasp that more heavily defended lines would mean greater sacrifices? Media portrayals of inevitable success proved to be a mistake, as morale among the Ukrainian civil and military populations dropped after the offensive. Comparing this to D-Day or Operation Overlord during WWII, where the Allies were prepared to endure significant casualties for victory, highlights a crucial point. The reluctance of the Ukrainian government to disclose casualty numbers, and the public’s reaction when figures were released, reflects this delicate balance. President Zelensky stated that 31,000 soldiers had perished since the full-scale invasion, but many Ukrainians believed this number was downplayed. There is a subtle distinction between the cost and the worth of regaining lost territory.
Strategic mistake?
Circling back to Operation Overlord, this operation at some point became too big to fail. When Eisenhower encountered bad weather just before the invasion, he still proceeded with his decision to invade France, regardless. Ukrainian society and government didn’t seem to regard this counteroffensive as something crucial for the future of this war. Was it simply a strategic mistake that changed the balance in Russia’s favor?
Societal war
The chosen options were just a few of many. However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that it was one of the pivotal decisions in this war, though not a decisive one as we can see in 2024. Although it was not decisive, the decision has had long-term consequences, as Ukraine was depleted of shells, barrels, and initiative on the frontline, even as this text is being written. In my opinion, the decisive factor in this war is the Ukrainian and Russian societies, as this war becomes more significant to Russian society and its flawed interests. Meanwhile, Ukrainian society remains highly resilient, but the depletion of resources is limiting its capabilities on the frontline. Thus, the final outcome will be determined by the societies.